Will Morsi repeat in Syria Nasser’s mistake in Yemen?

According to some news reports, the Egyptian presidency is “seriously considering the Qatari proposal of sending Arab forces to Syria”. We do not know yet what the conditions of this decision would imply. But we know that until further notice, Egypt will not be able to keep a tight grip on the Sinai Peninsula, let alone send troops to Syria and taking control of the country after the fall of Assad. Morsi himself had vowed to topple Assad twice; once in Tehran to prove his distinction from the Axis of Iran and its Shiites, another time in Ankara in harmony with the Turkish policies in their Erdogann-like edition (Erdogan is Turkey’s Prime Minister) that never stops reminding of the Ottoman past of the modern Turkish state. We have no idea whether the Egyptian presidential statement is serious or whether it is an attempt to seduce Turkey’s government, especially as it was issued during the Morsi’s visit to Turkey as a guest of honour at the ruling Justice and Development annual congress. Many observers did not take the Qatari initiative seriously. The US Secretary of Defence warned against solitary military intervention in Syria away from the UN Security Council. Not one Arab country has the ability to send troops of any weight to Syria. Many Arab countries are incapable of guarding their own borders or insuring their internal security despite the weapon deals of hard-to-believe digits made with Washington. In utmost cases, these countries can send observers that may be armed - or better unarmed – or troops to disengage the conflicting parties or keep peace between them. This requires approval from the regime and the opposition in Syria equally, which is a hard-to-get approval from the opposition and an impossible one from the regime in particular. Some sources say that only the first part of the Qatari initiative, related to Arab forces, was announced. Based on reaction to this part, and in case it’s welcomed by the “Arab capitals of leverage”, the second part of the initiative would be introduced which adds an Islamic tune in an attempt to drag Turkey into the arena of military intervention. Turkey alone is capable of making a difference on the ground not only because  the country has a significant and tested military power, but also because it’s the only neighbouring country that can allow the troops to access the country more easily to liberate Syrian regions under control of armed opposition. But the stakes for the other part of the Qatari initiative, if it proved to be existent as they have been kept quiet, are definitely low. Turkey refuses to play the role that the Assad regime played in Lebanon on 1977 in what was known as the Arab Deterrent Force when the Syrian army remained solely in the field after the different Arab military units withdrew from Lebanon. The Arab forces had withdrawn before completing their mission of ending the prolonged Lebanese civil war, which went on for nearly thirteen years up until the Taif Accords. In Turkey, the public opinion opposes Turkish military involvement in Syria, particularly any intervening measure that doesn’t stand under an Arab and American umbrella. This fact has compelled Turkey to take steps backwards so far, such as asking the Free Syrian Army to transfer their operations headquarters inside Syria, the limitations that Turkey started setting for Syrian refugees, and some restriction of the activities of armed opposition, their supporters and sponsors in Antakya, as well as the rest of border areas with Syria. And who ever said that the US, principally after the Benghazi incident, is about to involve its military in the Syrian crisis - even through the Arab gate? Who said that they want to topple the regime and dismantle it? They definitely want Assad to leave but they are concerned about the potential collapse of the regime’s security and military institutions. This probably won’t put off some of the more enthusiastic Arab capitals from military approach, decisiveness and intervention. In my view, the statement of the Egyptian presidency is predominantly emotive, and inspired by the “pulpit terminology” of the president-elect, nothing more, nothing less. Egypt, Abdel-Nasser and Nasserites paid a high price for the war in Yemen and their intervention on the ground. I think the June 1967 defeat was the fruit of this intervention. It is certain that an Egyptian military intervention in the Syrian civil war under a Qatari flag would be destructive for Egypt, for Morsi, and for the Muslim Broterhood. I fear that the saying would go for Morsi one day that he “broke his rod in his first battle”. ---- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.