The battle of Aleppo and the showdown with Turkey

The Syrian regime's leaders -or perhaps those who still remain -  are supposed to ask themselves a question: To what end will oppression lead them? And how can Bashar al-Assad's regime keep control over Syria after all that has happened in the country throughout the last 16 months? Assuming the regime is capable of destroying the entire city of Aleppo, what purpose would they be aiming to achieve? Didn't this regime learn anything from what Hafez al-Assad had done in Hama, when he destroyed quite a large part of the city, killed thousands of its residents and turned tens of thousands homeless, only for the city to rise up against his son 30 years later?  It looks like none of the Syrian regime's leaders have the ability to answer any of those questions. Those who were courageous enough to acknowledge the reality have decided to defect from the regime; Brigadier General Manaf Tlas and the Syrian ambassador to Iraq Nawaf al-Fares are just examples of several officers and officials who recognised that this regime has no future. Figures of the weight of Tlas and Fares should be well aware of everything related to this regime, so their defection must be considered as a clear indication that the end of an era is looming in Syria and a comprehensive change is certainly needed. This change -if successful- would lead to a transitional period, otherwise, the country would be expected to witness civil or regional wars, and it is always easy to know how this type of war erupts. It is however impossible to know how it will come to an end. It could be said that these wars have already erupted in Syria, however, they are still limited, waiting for the result of the battle of Aleppo and the showdown which the Syrian regime has provoked with Turkey through the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) led by Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan is the same person whom the Syrian authorities have indirectly gifted to Turkey by enforcing his extradition from Syria in 1998. The last few days have seen two main developments; first was the bombing that targeted the "crisis cell" in Damascus, leaving prominent security leaders dead, including Hisham Bakhtiar and Assef Shawkat. The second development was bringing the regime's troops to Aleppo in order to attack the city, and in the same time pushing the Kurdish fighters to attack Turkish targets.  What we can understand from those two developments is that the regime leaders have lost any sense of assessment as they believe that they can defeat the rebel cities by using the same way used by Hafez al-Assad in Hama in 1982. Further than this, is that they believe that the PKK fighters would be an effective card against Turkey.  The Syrian regime keeps failing in drawing the lessons of the recent past. Bashar al-Assad still imagines that he is the Syrians' beloved, and that he has many supporters in Daraa, Douma, Damscus, Zabadani, Homs, Rastan, Hama, Idlib, Deir al-Zor and Latakia. He still can't recognise that he had lost everything and that he never had any sort of legitimacy. The only thing Bashar could really do when the uprising broke out was to move to Kirdaha city -if possible- where he can enjoy the wealth of his family.  Unfortunately for him, he will never be able to enjoy the power or the wealth as he will certainly be pursued by both the Syrian people and the international community until the last day of his life. He has only Iran and Russia to resort to. However, if his position keeps deteriorating he couldn't even be granted asylum in either of the two countries, especially taking into consideration that the Iranian regime itself will also fall  sooner or later, as this type of regime has no place in the future.  After what happened in Lebanon in 2004 2005; the two years which saw the re-election of President Emile Lahoud, the assassination of prime minister Rafiq Hariri and the Syrian army's exit from Lebanon, it was clear that Bashar al-Assad knows very little about Lebanon and the Lebanese. The only thing he knew was the stories he was told by his advisors about Lebanon being a "fragile" state. They said that to him only to satisfy his ego. But the result was that he failed to recognise the unique character of Lebanon, and the fact that it was much stronger than the Syrian character, even after the damage that took place in Lebanon due to the Arabs' decision to make the Lebanese territories their only open front in their wars against Israel. After the Syrian revolution broke out, it was revealed that Bashar doesn't even know about his own country and his own people, he simply thought that he could replicate what his father had done in Hama 30 years ago. He didn't understand that he should have stepped down his position two or three months after the beginning of the uprising at furthest, as this period was just enough to show him how his regime was deeply rejected by the Syrians. The latest from Bashar is that he now attempts to blow up a conflict with Turkey, which maintained the highest level of self-control against his regime since the beginning of the Syrian uprising. However, the Turks might tolerate most of Bashar's games, but they will never tolerate his union with the PKK. This card failed for the Syrians when they tried to use it in the 1980s and 1990s. The result was their surrender that saw them extraditing Öcalan and acknowledging that the disputed Iskenderun district is Turkish soil.  The escalation against Turkey which is married with the military campaign against Aleppo is indicating that Bashar's resistance will quickly come to an end. What reward would Turkey get this time after the fall of the Syrian regime? Could they really keep watching what is happening in Syria after Bashar without any interference?        --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.